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BIANNUAL SURVEY
ARTICLE 75-ABITRATIoN
Demand for arbitration - CPLR 7503(c): Two notices held
to constitute a valid demand.
CPLR 7503(c) makes provision for service of a notice of
intention to arbitrate. If the requirements of the section are com-
plied with, and the recipient of the notice fails to request a stay
of arbitration within ten days of service, the recipient will be pre-
cluded from objecting to the validity of the alleged agreement to
arbitrate. He will also be denied the right to object on the ground
of non-compliance with the alleged agreement. However, where
the court finds that the notice has been insufficient, the ten-day
limitation will not apply.2 7 5
In the case of Passik v. MVAIC276 the petitioner served a
demand for arbitration. The notice failed to state a lack of
insurance and thus was insufficient. Two weeks later a letter was
received by MVAIC which incorporated the initial notice and added
the denial of insurance coverage by petitioner's carrier. The court
held that both documents must be read together and denied
MVAIC's motion to stay the arbitration; the ground of the denial
was that the motion was made after the expiration of the ten-day
limitation period. The court reasoned that the purpose of 7503(c)
is to give notice of the proposed arbitration to the other party.
Therefore, if before an insufficient demand is acted upon, a further
notice is given and together the two notices comply with 7503(c),
the ten-day limitation period will commence to run only after
service of the second of the two papers.
While this case does indicate a judicial effort to uphold the
claimant's notice of arbitration, the practitioner is cautioned to
conform the first notice to the requirements of CPLR 7503(c).
The general indication from the cases is that the courts will not
often be so indulgent 2 77
Failure to apply for stay of arbitration after receiving notice of
intention to arbitrate.
CPLR 7503(3) provides: "A party may serve upon another
party a notice of intention to arbitrate . . . stating that unless the
party served applies to stay the arbitration within ten days after
such service he shall thereafter be precluded from objecting that a
valid agreement to arbitrate was not made. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
275 Hesslein & Co., v. Greenfield, 281 N.Y. 26, 22 N.E.2d 149 (1939).
27642 Misc. 2d 447, 248 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
277 Porteck v. MVAIC, 19 App. Div. 2d 802, 243 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1st Dep't
1963); Double E Food Mkts., Inc. v. Beatson, 18 App. Div. 2d 976, 238
N.Y.S.2d 280 (1st Dep't 1963) (memorandum dec;:ion); Herzberg v. MVAIC,
42 Misc. 2d 790, 249 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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In Application of Ledo Realty Corp.,278 the petitioner Ledo (the
owner of real estate) had served a notice of intention to arbitrate
on the respondent Casualty Co., a surety under a contract between
petitioner and a contractor. The respondent did not apply for a
stay of arbitration within the ten-day period and thereafter
petitioner moved for an order to compel arbitration which the
court granted. Respondent then moved to vacate the order on the
ground it was not subject to an arbitration agreement. The court
granted the motion and held that the ten-day caveat of CPLR
7503(c) does not preclude the court from determining whether a
valid agreement to arbitrate was made. Here, the respondent
surety had not signed the contract between petitioner and the con-
tractor which contained the arbitration agreement, and its surety
bond did not provide for arbitration. Therefore, no valid agree-
ment had been made under which respondent could be compelled
to arbitrate.
The court's decision in the instant case is salutary in that it
does not allow legal issues to be withdrawn from the court's scrutiny
merely because of a procedural slip-up in failing to respond within
the ten-day limitation period of 7503(c). However, the decision
appears to run against the express language of the statute. The
statute clearly indicates that the failure to apply for a stay of
arbitration within ten days will bar the subsequent raising of all
pre-arbitration issues.2
Because of the extremely rapid response required by the ten-
day limitation, the courts have been somewhat hostile to requests
that the respondent be held to forfeit his day in court by omitting
to move promptly against a demand to arbitrate.8 0 However, the
past decisions allowing the raising of pre-arbitration questions have
been based on the insufficiency of the notice of intention to
arbitrate. 281  None have held that where the notice of intention to
arbitrate is sufficient and the party notified fails to respond within
the ten-day period he may still raise pre-arbitration questions. 28 2
27843 Misc. 2d 380, 251 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct 1964).
279 CPLR 7503(c). Besides the objection to the invalidity of the arbitration
agreement the other pre-afbitration objections (threshold questions) appar-
ently barred under 7503(c) are whether the arbitration agreement was complied
with and whether the claim sought to be asserted is barred by the statute
of limitations. See MVAIC v. McCabe, 19 App. Div. 2d 349, 243 N.Y.S.2d
495 (1st Dep't 1963); 8 WEINSvN, KoR & MmiLs, N-w YoRK Civri
PRAcrIcE 117503.26 (1964); WACHTELL, NEW YoRK Civir PRAc'rCiC UNDER
THE CPLR 360 (1963).
8o8 WINsTEN, KoRN & MiU.ER, NEw YoRK Crvit PRACTCE 17503.29(1964).
28 Iatter of Hesslein & Co. v. Greenfield, 281 N.Y. 26, 31, 22 N.E.2d
149, 151 (1939); 8 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MmLER, op. cit. supra note 280.
282 But see Matter of Bernson Silk Mills v. Siegel & Co., 256 App. Div.
617, 11 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1st Dep't 1939).
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The court's interpretation of the statute may render uncertain
the finality of arbitration proceedings. If a party were allowed to
raise pre-arbitration questions at any time after the ten-day period
allowed by statute, the opposing party could never rely on the
conclusiveness of an arbitration award granted him. For example,
in Schafran & Finkel, Inc. v. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 2s 3 after
the entire arbitration controversy had been completed and an award
rendered for defendant, the plaintiff was allowed to bring an
independent equitable action to enjoin the confirmation of the award,
even though plaintiff had received notice of the arbitration but had
failed to take any action.28 4  Moreover, the court's interpretation
of CPLR 7503(c) may tend to subvert the main advantage of
arbitration-the speed with which an arbitration controversy can
be concluded.
Although in the instant case the equities favored permitting
respondent to raise the invalidity of the arbitration agreement (his
default was inadvertent) and while there is a strong public policy
to have such legal questions as the validity of arbitration agreements
determined by the courts, it cannot be said that the ten-day period
allowed by CPLR 7503(c) for interposing such objections is un-
reasonable. That fact and the advantages of stable and speedy
arbitration proceedings, should result in rejection of objections to
the arbitration unless raised within the ten-day period. In any
event, practitioners will be on perilous ground if they withhold
their objections in simple reliance upon the instant case. They
should act immediately after their client receives a notice of intention
to arbitrate, regardless of the fact that the claimant's demand for
arbitration appears wholly unfounded.
Injunction issued barring the prosecution of foreiqn action brought
in violation of agreement to arbitrate in New York.
May a party be enjoined from bringing an action in a foreign
jurisdiction in violation of an agreement to arbitrate disputes in
New York?
In H. M. Hamilton & Co. v. American Home Assur. Co.,28 5
plaintiff sought injunctive relief restraining defendants from further
pursuing their legal action against plaintiff in the state of Georgia.
283280 N.Y. 164, 19 N.E.2d 1005 (1939); 16 N.Y.U.L. REy. 641 (1939),
4 The court of appeals based the decision on the insufficiency of the notice
to inform the plaintiff of the consequences of his failure to answer within the
ten days. CPLR 7503(c) makes such information mandatory in the notice
and it was contained in the notice in the instant case. However, even in the
instant case the court indicated that the notice may have been insufficient too
for failing to 'appraise respondent of the issues sought to be arbitrated. Ap-
plication of Ledo Realty Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 380, 382, 251 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
28521 App. Div. 2d 500, 251 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1st Dep't 1964).
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